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ABSTRACT: William James’s critics argued early on that 
James’s pragmatist conception of truth, according to 
which truth is what “works”, leads to subjectivism and 
irrationalism. This paper engages in a critical self-reflection 
of pragmatism and asks whether there is a “slippery 
slope” from James’s views on truth via Richard Rorty’s 
radical neopragmatism to truth-denialism and post-
factualism exemplified by both real-life populist politics 
and the fictional character of O’Brien in George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, a novel insightfully yet problemati-
cally interpreted by Rorty in an essay on the relation be-
tween truth and freedom. The paper argues for a 
pragmatically pluralist conception of truth capable of 
accommodating realism and objectivity within pragma-
tism. 
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“What happened to the truth is not recorded” 
(Julian Barnes, Flaubert’s Parrot. London: Vin-
tage, 2009 [1984], 65) 
 
 
Introduction: Vulgar Pragmatism? 
 
Together with a group of Finnish colleagues, I have since 
1999 been involved in writing and revising a series of 
philosophy textbooks for high-school students, published 
by the Finnish publishing house Edita, which specializes 
in textbooks and non-fiction books (though not in schol-
arly publishing). In an introductory book published in 
2005, we included a brief discussion of “the pragmatist 
theory of truth” in the context of a more general explo-
ration of the concept of truth. As textbooks usually do, 
our books also include a lot of pictures, hopefully keep-
ing their young readers alert. For the truth-theoretical 
section, we decided to use a photograph of Donald 
Trump, picturing him with his bestseller, How to Become 
Rich. In those years, Trump was not at all well known in 
Finland, although he was already at that point a famous 
celebrity in the United States. I can’t remember who 
decided to use the picture in the book; I certainly had no 
idea whatsoever who this guy was, and I had never 
heard of him before. The point of the photograph was 
obvious: we asked whether the sentences of Trump’s 
books are true if they make their author (or, possibly, 
their reader) rich and if they in that sense pragmatically 
“work”. Getting rich would then be their concrete “cash 
value”. 
 Little, of course, did we know: I could never have 
imagined that I would write a paper seriously asking 
whether there is a slippery slope leading from William 
James all the way down to Donald Trump, and even 
beyond, but this is precisely what I am now doing. If 
Trump is a pragmatist, he is certainly the most vulgar 
pragmatist there can be.1 Susan Haack (1995) once 
called Richard Rorty’s pragmatism “vulgar”, contrasting 
it with Peircean pragmatism, in particular, but it should 
be obvious that there can be no serious comparison 
between pragmatist intellectuals like Rorty (no matter 
how controversial their views might be) and truly vulgar 
“pragmatists” like Trump, many of whose pronounce-
ments are not only false but degrading, insulting, full of 
hate, and a continuous threat not just to world economy 
but to world peace. Fortunately, the disgraceful Trump 
presidency is over, but the political divisions yielding 
post-truth populism will unfortunately continue to trou-
ble us, as we are witnessing the fragility of democracy 
not only in the United States but in other countries as 
well. I do believe we must seriously consider how exactly 
pragmatism is related to the kind of attitude to truth and 
reality that we find Trump, and his supporters, exempli-
fying. The worry that there might indeed be something 
like a slippery slope from James – via Rorty – to Trump is 
to be taken seriously: are post-factualists “James’s chil-
dren”, and if so, in what sense exactly?2 
                                                 
1 During Obama’s presidency, there was serious scholarly dis-
cussion (including a special session at the Society for the Ad-
vancement of American Philosophy and a thematic issue of the 
journal Contemporary Pragmatism) on “Obama’s pragmatism”, 
i.e., on how Obama’s background at the University of Chicago 
might have exposed him to pragmatist influences that could 
have played a role in his thinking about law and politics, among 
other things. In Trump’s era, an analogous talk about his 
“pragmatism” would be a dark joke, comparable perhaps to 
Mussolini’s well-known interest in William James. 
2 The allusion here, as any historian of pragmatism easily recog-
nizes, is to Murphey’s (1968) characterization of the classical 
Cambridge pragmatists as “Kant’s children” – a view that I largely 
share. Note that the reason I am focusing on James and Rorty in 
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There is no need to describe even in general terms 
the ways in which Trump and his supporters, like many 
other populists in many other countries, on the one 
hand deliberately lie in order to advance their own pur-
suits and on the other hand just do not seem to care 
about the distinction between truth and falsehood at all 
– or care about it only in the crudest possible “pragmat-
ic” sense of having their own interests served. We all 
know very well how Trump’s disrespect for truth is con-
sistently manifested3 in his actions and public state-
ments, including his incredible tweets. In an extremely 
crude sense of pragmatism, those speech acts openly 
loathsome of truth and the commitment to pursue the 
truth may have been pragmatically “true”, as they did 
bring Trump to his powerful position.4 They indeed 
pragmatically “worked” for him – but they certainly do 
not seem to work from the point of view of those suffer-
ing from the political and economic catastrophes of his 
presidency.5 In this situation, many people disillusioned 
                                                                       
this paper is purely practical: it is in the work of these two prag-
matists that the threat of a “slippery slope” is the most striking. 
Other pragmatist contributions to debates on the concept of 
truth, including, say, Charles S. Peirce’s or (in contemporary 
pragmatism) Robert Brandom’s, would not as obviously lead to 
such problems. On the other hand, I am definitely not committed 
to the picture of there being two clearly distinguishable pragma-
tisms, the Peircean realistic one and the more relativist or sub-
jectivist one starting from James’s alleged misreading of Peirce; I 
find the pragmatist tradition much more complicated – and also 
more unified (cf., e.g., Pihlström 2008, 2015, 2020).  
3 Even this is incoherent or a bad joke: one needs the concept of 
truth to be consistent at anything, including one’s disrespect for 
truth. 
4 Moreover, Trump of course perversely uses the notion of 
truth, as well as related notions like “fake news”, always sug-
gesting that what he says is true and what his opponents say is 
false. For some illustrative picks from among thousands of pos-
sible examples, see, e.g., https://www.theguardian.com 
/books/2018/jul/14/the-death-of-truth-how-we-gave-up-on-
facts-and-ended-up-with-trump and https://edition.cnn.com/ 
2018/07/25/politics/donald-trump-vfw-unreality/index.html. 
On the latter occasion Trump is reported to have urged his sup-
porters: “Stick with us. Don’t believe the crap you see from 
these people, the fake news. ... What you’re seeing and what 
you’re reading is not what’s happening.” It is of course a tradi-
tional populist strategy to claim that only the populist leader 
has some privileged access to what is “really” happening. Even 
at the final stages of his delusional campaign denying the facts 
of the 2020 Election, he continued to claim that “the facts” 
were on his side. 
5 It could be argued that even Trump himself in the end col-
lapsed due to his truth-denialism, including his inability to take 
seriously the facts of the covid-19 pandemic. This can be left for 
political historians to examine. 
by political developments talk about “post-factualism” 
and the “post-truth era”, and if there is any individual 
who can act as a face for this cultural situation, it is 
presumably Trump (surrounded, of course, by an alarm-
ing number of leaders of major countries all over the 
world who share the willingness to sacrifice truth in the 
interest of greed and power). 
Ironically, on the page next to the one with Trump’s 
picture in our 2005 textbook, we placed a picture of a 
Soviet citizen reading the newspaper Pravda (meaning 
“truth”). Every statement contained in the pages of that 
official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union had gone through strict censorship by the Soviet 
authorities. There was just one official truth available, 
the view the Party held, and though our situation is 
different – in Trump’s era, there seem to be no shared 
truth (or shared falsity) available at all but just a confus-
ing rhapsody of self-serving tweets – we might be in an 
equally serious danger of losing contact with truth and 
reality. 
I will now ask whether the pragmatists are in some 
ways guilty of this development. The two main figures I 
will focus on are, unsurprisingly, James and Rorty. There 
is no point in offering any close reading of their well-
known views here,6 but I will explore them in the context 
of the worries many of us share regarding Trump and 
other truth-degrading populists in our confusing political 
world today. 
 
William James on Truth 
 
It needs to be emphasized that, far from leading to 
radical relativism or political opportunism, James’s (as 
well as Dewey’s) pragmatism functions as a link between 
the crucial relevance of the concept of truth and the 
emphasis on individual plurality and spontaneity.7 I 
would like to suggest that it is through Jamesian pragma-
                                                 
6 One of the best recent examinations of the pragmatic concep-
tion of truth is Capps 2019. 
7 The main sources for James’s views here are, of course, Prag-
matism and The Meaning of Truth (James 1975 [1907] and 1978 
[1909], respectively). 
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tism that we can bring the notion of truth itself bear on 
the analysis of human experiential plurality and unique 
individuality (see also, e.g., Cormier 2001, Capps 2019). 
This requires, however, that we not only maintain that 
there is a plurality of truths, or that truths may be rela-
tivized to a plurality of practice-laden human perspec-
tives of inquiry, but seriously try to understand and 
reconceptualize the concept of truth itself from a Jame-
sian pragmatist perspective. Pragmatic pluralism in a 
Jamesian style insists that individual perspectives and 
commitments to truth-seeking matter to what truth is or 
means for us. This is clear in James: truth is always truth-
for-someone-in-particular, an individual person pursuing 
truth both generally and in, e.g., their existential, ethical, 
or religious lives, not abstract truth-in-general. 
The pragmatist theory of truth is far from uncontro-
versial, as anyone who ever read undergraduate text-
books on truth knows. We might, however, approach it 
in terms of the distinction between truth and truthful-
ness (very interestingly analyzed in Williams 2002). 
These are clearly different notions, but they are also 
connected. One may pursue truthfulness without there-
by having true beliefs; one can be truthful also when one 
is mistaken, insofar as one sincerely seeks to believe 
truths and avoid falsehoods and also honestly seeks to 
tell the truth whenever possible (and whenever the truth 
to be told is relevant). Clearly, whatever one’s theory of 
truth is, one should in some way distinguish between 
truth and truthfulness. 
On the other hand, certain accounts of truth, such as 
the pragmatist one, may be more promising than some 
others in articulating the intimate relation between 
those two concepts. We might say that this distinction is 
“softened” in James’s pragmatist conception of truth, 
which rather explicitly turns truth into a value to be 
pursued in one’s (individual and social) life rather than 
mind- and value-independent objective propositional 
truth corresponding to facts that are just “there” no 
matter how we as truth-seekers (or truth-tellers) engage 
with or relate ourselves to them. Truth in the Jamesian 
sense is richer and broader than mere propositional 
truth precisely because it incorporates truthfulness – a 
normative commitment to truth – as a dimension of the 
notion of truth itself. Truth, then, is a normative proper-
ty of our practices of thought and inquiry in a wide sense 
and in this way something that our practice-embedded 
life with the concepts we have involves, not simply a 
semantic property of statements or a metaphysical 
property of propositions that could be taken out of that 
context of life-practices. Its normativity is, we might say, 
both epistemic and ethical. James’s pragmatic concep-
tion of truth hence crucially accommodates truthfulness, 
as truth belongs to the ethical field of inter-human rela-
tions of mutual dependence and acknowledgment. Truth 
is an element of this “being with others” (to borrow a 
Heideggerian term out of context). It also incorporates 
an acknowledgment of the inner truth (and truthfulness) 
of others’ experiences.8  
Jamesian pragmatic truth is also inextricably entan-
gled with our individual existential concerns; therefore, 
it is indistinguishable from James’s general individualism 
(see, e.g., Pawelski 2007). Individuals’ responses to their 
existential life-challenges vary considerably, and any 
ethically, politically, existentially, or religiously relevant 
conception of truth must in some sense appreciate this 
temperamental9 variation – without succumbing to the 
temptations of uncritical subjectivism or relativism, 
though. Now, if we for ethical reasons do wish to take 
seriously the Jamesian approach to individual diversity, 
as I think we should, then we must pay attention to what 
he says about the “plasticity” of truth and about truth 
being a “species of good”: 
 
                                                 
8 This particularly concerns others’ experiences of suffering (cf. 
Kivistö and Pihlström 2016, chapter 5; Pihlström 2008, 2019, 
2020). Only irresponsible metaphysical speculation about, say, 
“theodicies” leads us to postulate a false transcendent mean-
ingfulness for such experiences. My “antitheodicist” reading of 
James is very closely connected with my understanding of his 
conception of truth and truthfulness, but this is a large topic 
that must be set aside here. 
9 James’s (1975 [1907], Lecture I) account of individual philo-
sophical temperaments should, I think, be understood in close 
entanglement with his notion of truth. There is no way of com-
pletely disentangling the temperamental aspects from our prac-
tices of pursuing the truth. 
Pragm at ism Tod ay Vol .  11 ,  Issue 2 ,  2020  
JAMES’S CHILDREN? POST FACTUALISM AS A DESCENDANT OF THE PRAGMATIST CONCEPTION OF TRUTH 
S a m i  P i h l s t r ö m
 
 
   
Truth independent; truth that we find merely; 
truth no longer malleable to human need; truth 
incorrigible, in a word; such truth exists indeed 
superabundantly – or is supposed to exist by ra-
tionalistically minded thinkers; but then it means 
only the dead heart of the living tree, and its be-
ing there means only that truth also has its pale-
ontology and its ‘prescription,’ and may grow 
stiff with years of veteran service and petrified in 
men’s regard by sheer antiquity. But how plastic 
even the oldest truths nevertheless really are has 
been vividly shown in our day by the transfor-
mation of logical and mathematical ideas, a 
transformation which seems even to be invading 
physics. (James 1975 [1907], Lecture II) 
 
… truth is one species of good, and not, as is usu-
ally supposed, a category distinct from good, and 
co-ordinate with it. The true is the name of 
whatever proves itself to be good in the way of 
belief, and good, too, for definite, assignable rea-
sons. (Ibid.) 
 
Another famous Jamesian formulation relevant here is 
this: 
Pragmatism, on the other hand [in contrast to 
other accounts of truth], asks its usual question. 
“Grant an idea or belief to be true,” it says, 
“what concrete difference will its being true 
make in anyone’s actual life? How will the truth 
be realized? What experiences will be different 
from those which would obtain if the belief were 
false? What, in short, is the truth’s cash-value in 
experiential terms?” The moment pragmatism 
asks this question, it sees the answer: true ideas 
are those that we can assimilate, validate, cor-
roborate and verify; false ideas are those that we 
cannot. That is the practical difference it makes 
to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is the 
meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-
as. This thesis is what I have to defend. The truth 
of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in 
it. Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is 
made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, 
a process: the process namely of its verifying it-
self, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of 
its valid-ation. (Ibid., Lecture VI) 
 
Note how easy it is to interpret such ideas in the “vulgar” 
way. Truth “happens” to an idea when that idea leads to 
useful results in one’s life – such as one’s becoming rich 
and powerful, for instance. However, it should be obvi-
ous that, no matter how careless James’s formulations 
were, such crude pragmatism was never James’s own 
view. He is unclear and controversial, but he is certainly 
not recommending that we just replace truth with our 
wishful thinking or political and economic pursuit of 
power.10 
Several outstanding James scholars have already 
shown how nuanced James’s view on truth is – also in 
the political sphere – so I only need to cite a few read-
ings to emphasize this point. In his discussion of James’s 
theory of truth, which I find highly pertinent to these 
concerns (cf. also Pihlström 2013, chapter 4), Jose Medi-
na (2010) defends Jamesian pluralism in a politically 
relevant manner: in ethics and politics, we can never 
reach an “absolute” conception of what is universally 
best for human beings and societies, but different sug-
gestions, opinions, experiential perspectives, and inter-
ests must have their say – that is, must be acknowledged 
(though this is not Medina’s exact terminology). A con-
ception of political solidarity can, then, be grounded in 
Jamesian ideas about truth. James maintains not only 
pluralism and individualism but also (on Medina’s read-
ing) a relational conception of individual identities: 
nothing exists in a self-sustained manner but only as 
parts of networks of mutual interdependence. Such a 
metaphysics of diversity and relationality needs, fur-
thermore, the concept of acknowledgment: we must 
sincerely (which is not to say uncritically) respond to 
even those perspectives on life that we find alien or even 
repulsive, though this is much more easily said than it is 
done. While James’s pluralism and relationalism are, 
according to Medina, elements of a metaphysical view 
according to which everything must be understood in 
relation to other things, in terms of ubiquitous relation-
ality, they are irreducibly ethical and political ideas, 
applying even to the reality of the (epistemic, ethical, 
political) self.  
                                                 
10 Note also that James is here speaking about the potential 
consequences of our ideas or beliefs (actually) “being true”, not 
about the consequences of their being believed to be true. The 
passage just quoted is therefore one of the more realistic for-
mulations of the pragmatic conception of truth by James, even 
presupposing his commitment to something like (a minimalist 
version of) the correspondence theory truth. Generally, howev-
er, James is much less clear than Peirce in formulating his prag-
matism as a principle concerning not just the consequences of 
the truth of our ideas but of those ideas being believed or en-
tertained by us (cf. Pihlström 2015). 
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It is precisely in this context that we should, according 
to Medina, appreciate James’s theory of truth. True beliefs 
are, as James says, “good to live by”; when maintaining a 
belief, any belief, we are responsible for its consequences 
in our lives, and in those of others. The pragmatic “theory” 
of truth – which should not be called a “theory”, in order to 
avoid seeing it as a rival to, say, the “correspondence theo-
ry” – invokes not only, say, the satisfactory or agreeable 
consequences of true beliefs but also ethical ideas such as 
solidarity and justice in terms of which the functionality of 
our beliefs ought to be measured. Therefore, we may say 
that truth (in the pragmatic sense), truthfulness, and the 
acknowledgment of otherness are conceptually tied to 
each other in James’s pragmatism. One cannot genuinely 
pursue truth in the Jamesian sense unless one also 
acknowledges, or at least truthfully seeks to acknowledge, 
others’ perspectives on reality – indeed, the uniqueness of 
such individual perspectives, and their potentiality of open-
ing up genuine novelties. If we take this articulation of 
Jamesian pragmatic truth seriously, then we can immedi-
ately see how vulgar a “Trumpist” version of pragmatism is. 
Trump’s views may in some sense be “satisfactory” or 
“agreeable” for him and his opportunistic (or cynical and 
disillusioned) supporters, but they can hardly be said to 
truly acknowledge other perspectives on the world, let 
alone to honor any commitment to pursuing the truth 
independently of personal or political benefit.  
The pragmatist account of truth is also connected 
with James’s moral philosophy by Sarin Marchetti (2015, 
33), one of the most perceptive recent commentators of 
James. It is easy for us to agree with his general claim 
that pragmatism as a philosophical method also incorpo-
rates a fundamentally ethical intention based on a con-
ception of ethics as self-transformation and –cultiva-
tion.11 He maintains that James is not primarily advance-
                                                 
11 In addition to being an application of the “pragmatic meth-
od”, we might say that in a sense the Jamesian approach to 
metaphysics is an application of the pragmatist conception of 
truth. On James (1975 [1907]) as engaging in a pragmatically 
shaped metaphysical inquiry (rather than rejecting metaphysics 
altogether), see, e.g., Pihlström 2009, 2013. Our ideas ex-
pressed or expressible by means of concepts like substance, 
God, freedom, etc. – our metaphysical views and commitments 
ing a theory of truth but “using pragmatism to unstiffen 
our views on truth and put them to work” (ibid., 169). 
We are invited to rethink the meaning of truth “in our 
lives”, and James is therefore offering us a “genealogical 
phenomenology” of this concept (ibid., 177).12 Truth is 
something that dynamically functions in our ethical 
world-engagement, not a static relation between our 
beliefs (which are not static, either, but dynamically 
developing habits of action) and an allegedly independ-
ent external world. The concept of truth is also interest-
ingly entangled with James’s important but often 
neglected metaphor of blindness: “We are morally blind 
when we fail to see how the sources of truth are nested 
in the very meaning those experiences have for those 
who have them […]” – and the most serious blindness is 
our losing touch “with the meaning of our own truths 
and experiences” (ibid., 202, 205).13 
The commentators I have briefly cited (Medina and 
Marchetti) are of course only individual voices among 
many. They nevertheless help us note a certain approach 
to Jamesian truth that is inherently ethical. I have tried 
to capture this basic idea by using the concept of truth-
fulness, but that is obviously only one possible concept 
that can be used here. Regarding the active union of 
truth and ethics, I find myself mostly in agreement with 
Medina’s and Marchetti’s readings (without going into 
any great detail here).14 I will now have to move on to 
the worry that James’s pragmatist account of truth 
                                                                       
– are pragmatically “true” or “false” in so far forth as they put 
us in touch with ethically significant experiences. The truth of a 
metaphysical view can be assessed by means of the pragmatic 
criterion of its ability to open us to what James (1897) called 
“the cries of the wounded” (see also Kivistö and Pihlström 2016, 
chapter 5; Pihlström 2020). It is right here, in a pragmatist 
ethically structured metaphysics, that truth, in James’s memo-
rable phrase, “happens to an idea”. 
12 Pragmatism, James maintains (according to Marchetti), 
“transforms the absolutely empty notion of correspondence in 
a rich and active relationship between our truths and the way in 
which we can entertain them and thus engage the world” 
(Marchetti 2015, 184). For a non-empty correspondence theory, 
see, however, e.g., Niiniluoto 1999. 
13 As Marchetti notes, James sees the “possibility of overcom-
ing” such blindness as a “transformation of the self” (Marchetti 
2015, 206). The relevant reference here is James 1983 [1899]; 
see also Pihlström 2019. 
14 See Pihlström 2008, 2013, 2020 for my more comprehensive 
discussions of James’s pragmatism. 
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might be easily developed into a direction that turns 
problematic, especially in our “post-truth” era. 
 
Rorty (on Orwell) on Truth 
 
Rorty is famous for a version of pragmatism advocating 
what he calls ethnocentrism (“we have to start from 
where we are”, acknowledging our historical contingen-
cy) and antirepresentationalism (which rejects any rep-
resentational relations between language and reality, 
claiming that the traditional problems of realism and 
skepticism, among others, only arise in the context of 
representationalism). Here we cannot deal with the 
development of Rorty’s pragmatism, or its relation to 
truth, since his early work in the 1960s and 1970s to his 
late proposals to replace systematic philosophy by “cul-
tural politics”.15 I will focus on a specific strand of Rorty’s 
pragmatism, relevant (I suppose) to the worries about 
post-factualism raised in this paper. 
As was suggested earlier (and as other James com-
mentators like Marchetti have emphasized), the concept 
of truth, far from being restricted to the oft-ridiculed 
“pragmatist theory of truth”, is fundamentally important 
in James’s moral thought in general. It is in this context 
that we will now expand our horizon from James’s 
pragmatism to Rorty’s neopragmatism and especially to 
Rorty’s treatment of George Orwell. While discussions of 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four (1949) have often primari-
ly dealt with Winston, the main protagonist of the novel, 
Rorty’s treatment of Nineteen Eighty-Four finds O’Brien, 
the Party torturer, the most important character of the 
novel.16 
In his essay on Orwell, “The Last Intellectual in Eu-
rope” (in Rorty 1989), Rorty rejects the standard realistic 
reading of Nineteen Eighty-Four, according to which the 
                                                 
15 Again, I cannot review the development of the complex views 
of a major philosopher like Rorty here (any more than in the 
case of James). For Rorty’s pragmatism as an account of truth as 
what our “cultural peers” let us say, see Rorty 1979; for his anti-
representationalist understanding of pragmatism, see Rorty 
1991; and for philosophy as cultural politics, see Rorty 2007. 
16 The discussion here is partly based on the chapter on James, 
Rorty, and Orwell in Kivistö and Pihlström 2016. 
book defends an objective notion of truth in the context 
of a penetrating moral critique of the horrible and humil-
iating way in which Winston is made to believe that two 
plus two equals five. Consistently with his well-known 
position (if it can be regarded as a philosophical “posi-
tion” at all), Rorty (ibid., 173) denies that “there are any 
plain moral facts out there in the world, […] any truths 
independent of language, [or] any neutral ground on 
which to stand and argue that either torture or kindness 
are preferable to the other”. Orwell’s significance lies in 
a novel redescription of what is possible: he convinced 
us that “nothing in the nature of truth, or man, or histo-
ry” will block the conceivable scenario that “the same 
developments which had made human equality techni-
cally possible might make endless slavery possible” 
(ibid., 175). Hence, O’Brien, the “Party intellectual”, is 
Orwell’s key invention, and Orwell, crucially, offers no 
answer to O’Brien’s position: “He does not view O’Brien 
as crazy, misguided, seduced by a mistaken theory, or 
blind to the moral facts. He simply views him as danger-
ous and as possible.” (Ibid., 176.) 
The key idea here, according to Rorty, is that truth as 
such does not matter: “[…] what matters is your ability 
to talk to other people about what seems to you true, 
not what is in fact true” (ibid.).17 In Nineteen Eighty-Four, 
Winston’s self is destroyed as he is made to believe that 
two plus two equals five – and to utter “Do it to Julia!” 
when faced with his worst fear, the rats. Rorty points out 
that this is something he “could not utter sincerely and 
still be able to put himself back together” (ibid., 179). 
The notion of sincerity is highly central here, especially 
as it obviously establishes a link to the key idea of truth-
fulness that I above claimed to find at the heart of 
James’s account of truth. 
A basic distinction between truth and falsity is, how-
ever, necessary for the concepts of sincerity and truth-
fulness. Insofar as Rorty’s pragmatism carries Jamesian 
pragmatism into a certain extreme, one is left wondering 
                                                 
17 This is followed by the well-known Rortyan one-liner, “If we take 
care of freedom, truth can take care of itself.” (Rorty 1989, 176.) 
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whether there is any way to stop on the slippery slope 
arguably leading from James to Rorty (and eventually 
bringing in, with horror, first post-factualists like Trump 
and then Orwell’s O’Brien). Reality must still be con-
trasted with something like unreality, while truth and 
truthfulness must be opposed not only to falsity but also 
to lying and self-deception, and possibly other kinds of 
loss of sincerity and truthfulness that may follow from 
the collapse of the truth vs. falsity distinction itself. What 
we find here is, as we may say, the problem of realism in 
its existential dimensions. This is, arguably, the core 
pragmatic meaning of the problem of realism and truth, 
and therefore the very possibility of ethical truthfulness 
is a key pragmatist issue to be dealt with, not just mar-
ginal to the Jamesian-Rortyan engagement with truth. 
By destroying Winston’s capacity for sincerely utter-
ing something and still being able to “put himself back 
together”, O’Brien leads us to imagine the possibility of 
evil that renders truthfulness itself impossible. This will 
then collapse the Jamesian pragmatist conception of 
truth as well, given that it starts from a kind of pragmatic 
softening of the notion of objective truth culminating in 
the “truth happens to an idea” view that we may find 
characteristic of James’s ethically grounded metaphysics, 
and his pragmatism generally. 
While James only resisted certain metaphysically re-
alistic forms of metaphysics, especially Hegelian monistic 
absolute idealism (and corresponding metaphysical real-
isms), without thereby abandoning metaphysics alto-
gether (see Pihlström 2008, 2009, 2015), Rorty’s reading 
of Orwell is deeply based on his rejection of all forms of 
metaphysics. According to Rorty, Orwell is urging us that 
“whether our future rulers are more like O’Brien or more 
like J. S. Mill does not depend […] on deep facts about 
human nature” or on any “large necessary truths about 
human nature and its relation to truth and justice” but 
on “a lot of small contingent facts” (Rorty 1989, 187–
188). Now, this is hard to deny; various minor contingent 
facts have enormous influence on how our world and 
societies develop. This is also a very important message 
of Rortyan ironism in general: our firmest moral com-
mitments, our “final vocabularies”, are historically con-
tingent. But the worry is that if we give up (even prag-
matically rearticulated) objective truth entirely, we will 
end up giving up the very possibility of sincerity, too, and 
that is something we need for resisting the future of all 
possible O’Briens’ Newspeak seeking to justify evil, 
suffering, and torture. 
It is, indeed, one thing to accept, reasonably, histori-
cal contingency and to reject overblown metaphysics of 
“deep facts about human nature”; it is quite another 
matter to give up even a minimal pragmatic sense of 
objective truth required not only for truthfulness and 
sincerity but for their very possibility (and, hence, for the 
possibility of insincerity as well, because insincerity is 
possible only insofar as sincerity is possible, and vice 
versa), that is, the very possibility of keeping in touch 
with “the meaning of our own truths and experiences” 
(quoting Marchetti’s apt phrase again). 
I am not claiming that Rorty (or James) is wrong, or 
has a mistaken conception of truth (or facts, or history), 
but that if Rorty is right (whatever it means to say this, 
given the threatening disappearance, in his neopragma-
tism, of the distinction between being right and being 
regarded as being right by one’s cultural peers), then we 
may be in a bigger trouble regarding the place of truth in 
our lives than we may have naively believed. We may, 
then, lack sufficient philosophical resources for dealing 
with people like Trump. Jamesian pragmatism seems to 
take the correct, indeed vital, step toward integrating 
the ethically and existentially normative notion of truth-
fulness into the pragmatist account of truth itself, as we 
briefly saw. However, insofar as this kind of pragmatism 
develops into something like Rorty’s neopragmatism, 
which lets the notion of truth drop out as unimportant, 
the end result is not only an insightful emphasis on 
historical contingency18 but also the possible fragmenta-
tion of truthfulness itself, which seems to depend on a 
relatively robust distinction between truth and falsity. 
                                                 
18 As well as the role of literature in showing us fascinating, and 
dangerous, contingent possibilities (see also the other relevant 
essays in Rorty 1989; cf. Conant 2000). 
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What this shows is a quasi-Rortyan point: Orwell is more 
important, and O’Brien more dangerous, than we might 
have thought; and so is Trump (and therefore, further-
more, Rorty’s version of pragmatism as an intermediary 
stage between James and full-blow post-factualism is 
also more important than many pragmatism scholars 
might want to admit). But this also shows that Rorty in 
effect deprives us of the linguistic, literary, and philo-
sophical resources that we might have seen Orwell as 
equipping us with. 
This criticism of Rorty (which is, implicitly, a quali-
fied criticism of Jamesian pragmatism, though not a 
proposal to give it up but to carefully rethink its lasting 
value, being aware of its potential problems) comes 
close to James Conant’s (2000) devastating attack on 
Rorty’s reading of Orwell.19 According to Conant, Rorty 
is committed to (indeed, obsessed by) the same philo-
sophical prejudices as his metaphysically realist oppo-
nents in claiming that notions such as objectivity, facts, 
or historical truth are not in the focus of Orwell’s wor-
ries. Conant argues that Rorty fails to see that there is 
an “ordinary” way of using these and related concepts 
that need not be construed either metaphysically real-
istically or antirealistically (or in a Rortyan deflated 
manner); hence, “when our intellectual options are 
confined to a forced choice between Realist and Ror-
tian theses […] we are unable to recover the thoughts 
Orwell sought to express […]” (ibid., 279–280). Conant 
obviously does not dispute Rorty’s (or Orwell’s) em-
phasis on historical contingency, but he argues that in a 
perfectly ordinary sense, “the demise of ‘the possibility 
of truth’” could still be an extremely scary scenario 
(ibid., 285–286). In Conant’s view, Orwell’s novel is 
primarily “about the possibility of a state of affairs in 
which the concept of objective truth has faded as far 
out of someone’s world as it conceivably can” (ibid., 
                                                 
19 See also Rorty 2000. Conant’s essay is, in my view, one of the 
best critical discussions of Rorty’s project in general, by no 
means restricted to the interpretation of Nineteen Eighty-Four – 
yet, as it focuses on that book and Rorty’s reading of it, it does 
show us something about the fundamental philosophical rele-
vance of Orwell’s novel. 
297),20 and therefore it is directly relevant to our con-
cerns here. 
Conant contests in a thoroughgoing manner Rorty’s 
deflated reading of O’Brien’s character as someone who 
simply enjoys torturing Winston and seeks to “break 
him” for no particular reason (see ibid., especially 290). 
Truth and truthfulness do, he maintains, occupy a cen-
tral place in Orwell’s analysis of what is really frightening 
in totalitarianism; in this way, the debate between Rorty 
and Conant on these notions in the context of Nineteen 
Eighty-Four directly continues the general pragmatist 
struggle with truth and truthfulness.21 O’Brien’s “unqual-
ified denial of the idea that (what Orwell calls) ‘the con-
cept of objective truth’ has application to the past” 
(ibid., 308) can be directly applied to Jamesian sincerity 
and truthfulness. It must be possible for the Jamesian 
pragmatist to argue that O’Brien has given up any ethical 
commitment to truthfulness through his arbitrary reduc-
tion of truth to the opinion of the Party. But then, pace 
Rorty, freedom and the availability of the concept of 
objective truth are inseparable: 
What [Orwell’s] novel aims to make manifest is 
that if reality control and doublethink were ever 
to be practiced on a systematic scale, the possi-
bility of an individual speaking the truth and the 
possibility of an individual controlling her own 
mind would begin simultaneously to fade out of 
the world. The preservation of freedom and the 
preservation of truth represent a single indivisi-
ble task for Orwell – a task common to literature 
and politics. (Ibid., 310) 
                                                 
20 He also says the novel “is perhaps as close as we can come to 
contemplating in imagination the implications of the adoption 
of a resolutely Rortian conception of objectivity (that is, a 
conception in which the concept of objectivity is exhausted by 
that of solidarity)” (Conant 2000, 307). This formulation is 
better than the one quoted in the main text above because it 
avoids involving the notion of a state of affairs which might 
itself be regarded as a remnant of old “Realist” metaphysics. 
21 Note how different Orwell’s views on totalitarianism, at least 
on Conant’s reading, are from Hannah Arendt’s well-known 
ideas, in which the concentration camp is the epitomization of 
totalitarianism. (See Arendt 1958.) For Orwell, such atrocities 
are peripheral; hostility to truthfulness is the “really frighten-
ing” thing. (Conant 2000, 295.) Note, however, also that Rorty 
charges Conant of confusing truth with truthfulness (Rorty 
2000, 347). Conant says that the “capacity of individuals to 
assess the truth of claims on their own” threatens “the absolute 
hegemony of the Party over their minds” (Conant 2000, 299). 
This is presumably also why populist political movements are 
willing to cut down education, higher education in particular. 
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No matter how exactly we should read Orwell and Rorty, 
this is a fundamental link between freedom and truth, a 
link also needed to make sense of the very idea of truth-
fulness in its pragmatist meaning. In particular, the pre-
servation of freedom and truth – the task Conant argues 
is shared by literature and politics – is inseparably inter-
twined with the need to fight against “the corruption of 
language”, which corrupts our concepts and, thus, 
thought itself (ibid., 313).  
In the interest of being fair to Rorty, we can still try 
to understand the matter, and sketch our response to it, 
in Rortyan terms. Rorty, famously, rejects the very idea 
of our being responsible or answerable to any non-hu-
man objective reality – traditionally presupposed, he 
believes, in realist accounts of truth – and emphasizes 
that we can only be answerable to human audiences.22 
This could be analyzed as a relation of acknowledgment: 
we acknowledge human audiences as our potential 
rational critics in a way we cannot acknowledge any non-
human reality. Thus formulated, Rorty is not very far 
from Jamesian truthfulness, which involves the continu-
ous challenge of acknowledging others’ perspectives on 
the world (cf. above). However, part of our response to a 
(relevant) audience is a response to an audience using 
the concept of objective reality. We have to recognize 
the relevance of that concept by recognizing the relevant 
audience. This is a case of what has been called “medi-
ated recognition” (cf. Koskinen 2017, 2019): we recog-
nize objective reality and truth by recognizing the ap-
propriate audience(s) and our responsibility or answer-
ability toward it/them. We acknowledge objective reality 
itself by being answerable, and recognizing ourselves as 
being answerable, to an audience (e.g., potential rational 
critics) that might challenge our views on reality. 
Now, the problem here – to recapitulate our worries 
once more – is that the relevant audience could change 
in an Orwellian manner. The use and (thus) meaning 
(recalling the Wittgensteinian view that “meaning is 
                                                 
22 This theme runs through Rorty’s entire thought, but Contin-
gency, Irony and Solidarity, the book containing the Orwell 
essay, is one of its best articulations. 
use”) of the concept of objective truth could even be 
destroyed. Then the kind of mediated recognition allud-
ed to here would no longer work. In some sense there 
would no longer be an audience we would be responsi-
ble to anymore. And there would then be no views to 
have on anything anymore. Rational thought would col-
lapse. In other words, we can recognize each other as 
using the concept of an objective reality (and a related 
concept of truth), and thereby acknowledge each other 
and ourselves as being normatively – truthfully – com-
mitted to pursuing objective truth about reality – but 
only until O’Brien gets us. Then that commitment col-
lapses, and so does our acknowledgment of each other 
as users of the notion of truth – and, hence, of com-
municating agents. So does, then, our commitment to 
sincerity and truthfulness, which are needed for moral 
and political seriousness. 
Rorty then seems to be wrong about the idea that 
defending freedom would be sufficient for defending 
truth. It is certainly necessary but hardly sufficient. In 
particular, negative freedom from external constraints is 
not enough: what is needed is positive freedom and 
responsibility, hence commitment to truth-seeking, 
something that the Jamesian integration of truth with 
truthfulness succeeds in articulating. There certainly is a 
kind of unrestricted freedom in American politics, but 
truth apparently has not been able to take care of itself. 
Moreover, Rorty (1989, 188) himself needs to use the 
concept of truth – and related concepts such as the ones 
of fact and reality – when he reminds us that “[w]hat our 
future rulers will be like will not be determined by any 
large necessary truths about human nature and its rela-
tion to truth and justice, but by a lot of small contingent 
facts”. 
Interestingly, Rorty also maintains the following: “If 
we are ironic enough about our final vocabularies, and 
curious enough about everyone else’s, we do not have 
to worry about whether we are in direct contact with 
moral reality, or whether we are blinded by ideology, or 
whether we are being weakly ’relativistic’” (Ibid., 176–
177) This is, indeed, a very big “if”. We need to worry 
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about these matters precisely because we can never be 
sure we are able to be “ironic enough” and “curious 
enough”. These attitudes themselves require a commit-
ment to truthfulness. Our need to maintain a pragmatic 
conception of truth more realistic than Rorty’s can thus 
be seen to be based on Jamesian pragmatic reasons. 
Moreover, this need also emerges as a result of our 
taking seriously a crucial Rortyan lesson about the fun-
damental contingency of even our most basic conceptual 
commitments. It is precisely due to the fragility of truth – 
the possibility that O’Brien might arrive, as Orwell warns 
us, destroying our ability of distinguishing between truth 
and falsity – that we must cherish our Jamesian ability of 
responding, with ethical sincerity and truthfulness, to 
others’ perspectives along with our own continuous 
commitment to pursuing the truth. 
 
Conclusion: Truth, Pluralism, and Critical Philosophy 
 
In conclusion, and in order to further emphasize the poli-
tical significance of the issue, let me very briefly com-
pare these pragmatist elaborations on our need to be 
committed to the pursuit of truth – and the related 
integration of truth and truthfulness – to Hannah Ar-
endt’s views on truth (and Richard Bernstein’s useful 
reading of Arendt), especially as they are articulated in 
Arendt’s “Truth and Politics”, an essay originally pub-
lished in 1967 (see Arendt 2003). 
Arendt not only offered us an analysis of totalitarian-
ism of lasting relevance and an equally lasting defense of 
human spontaneity in its ethical and political dimensions 
but also an ever-timelier account of the significance of 
the concept of truth. In “Truth and Politics”, she carefully 
examines the often-antagonistic relation between truth-
fulness and political action, drawing attention to delib-
erate lying as a political force – and one may argue that 
her views are, for well-known reasons, even more rele-
vant today than they were half a century ago (see also 
Bernstein 2018, 67–83). She reminds us that while truth 
itself is “powerless”, it is also irreplaceable; political 
force, persuasion, or violence cannot substitute it, and 
“[t]o look upon politics from the perspective of truth […] 
means to take one’s stand outside the political realm”, 
from “the standpoint of the truthteller” (Arendt 2003, 
570). This kind of critical distance necessary for an ade-
quate understanding of the relation between truth and 
politics requires the age-old project of “disinterested 
pursuit of truth” (ibid., 573). It is, of course, this very 
project that the populist culture that brings into power 
people like Trump seeks to suppress. 
Is such disinterestedness available in pragmatism? 
Isn’t pragmatism, especially the Jamesian version of 
pragmatism we are preoccupied with here (let alone the 
Rortyan one), inevitably “interest-driven”, and doesn’t 
its individualism therefore open the doors for political 
manipulation and disrespect for truth? Why, more gen-
erally, is the concept of truth important for a sound 
appreciation of pragmatic pluralism and human diversi-
ty, after all, and why exactly should we aim at a pragma-
tist articulation of this concept in the first place? 
 A key to this issue is reflexivity: pragmatism – 
better than other approaches, I believe – is able to ac-
knowledge the meta-level “interests” guiding our pursuit 
of disinterestedness itself. We pragmatically need a 
concept of truth not serving any particular need or in-
terest. Thus, we also pragmatically need a deep plural-
ism (but not relativism) about truth. The reflection we 
are engaging in here, with the help of Arendt as well as 
James and Rorty, is in a crucial sense internal to pragma-
tism. We are asking what kind of purposes our different 
philosophical conceptualizations of truth, including the 
traditional realist (correspondence) one and the more 
comprehensive pragmatist one, are able to serve. In this 
sense, Jamesian pragmatism, I would like to suggest, 
“wins” at the meta-level. Its potential collapse to Trump-
ist populism or O’Brien’s destruction of truth is definitely 
a threat to be taken very seriously – especially if one is 
willing to take seriously Rorty’s developments of Jame-
sian (and Deweyan) pragmatism – but there is no reason 
to believe that a slide down the slippery slope would be 
unavoidable. By drawing attention to the continuous 
meta-level critical (and self-critical) inquiry into our own 
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commitments, and the truthful commitment to amelio-
rate our practices of truth (in science, ethics, politics, 
and everywhere else as well), we should be able to stop 
that slide. But where exactly it can be stopped is a ques-
tion that needs to be asked again and again in varying 
historical and cultural contexts. 
In the end, I think, we should defend a pragmatically 
pluralistic view about truth itself:23 there are many 
truths about truth, including realism and the related 
correspondence theory of truth, to be defended within 
pragmatism. These truths about truth are context-
embedded; for instance, we may need a realist corre-
spondence-theoretical account of truth within a political 
discourse opposing Trump (and O’Brien), but we may, 
and in my view do, need a pragmatist account within a 
more purely academic discourse on truth.24 A kind of 
pragmatic realism is certainly worth striving for: in the 
“post-factual” era of powerful populists, we should not 
too much emphasize the pragmatic “plasticity” of truth 
but, rather, the objectivity and realism inherent even in 
the Jamesian pragmatic conception of truth.25 The 
                                                 
23 For alethic pluralism (though in a form not based on pragma-
tism), see, e.g., Lynch 2009. In fact Wittgenstein (1980, 75) once 
suggested that we should not choose between the classical 
“theories” of truth, as all of them contain valuable insights into 
truth, and none of them is the whole truth about truth. 
24 In principle, Rorty’s neopragmatism may offer us valuable 
resources for switching between different context or “vocabu-
laries” and for developing a self-critically ironic attitude to 
them, even the most “final” ones. Therefore, my assessment of 
here is not at all purely negative, though I do think we should be 
concerned with its potential dangers. Rorty himself was lauda-
bly active in promoting pragmatism in the former communist 
East-European countries that opened up to Western ideas of 
freedom and democracy in the late 1980s and the 1990s – and 
the emergence of the Central European Pragmatist Forum is 
indeed part of this history, with a lot of pragmatism-related 
activities developing in countries like Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, 
and the Czech Republic in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The 
fact that the current situation in Europe does not look equally 
promising regarding, say, the development Deweyan democra-
cy is of course one of the background factors that need to be 
taken seriously by pragmatists now critically inquiring into the 
nature of truth.  
25 Critics of pragmatism also need to be constantly reminded 
that James himself repeatedly emphasized that he is denying 
neither the “standing reality” external to us nor the idea of 
truth as a relation of “agreement” between our ideas and that 
reality; rather, James’s investigations of truth are attempts to 
tell us what these notions can be taken to pragmatically mean – 
i.e., what they are “known as” in terms of human experience. 
Another matter that needs further elucidation is the fact that 
“truth” about these issues is itself a pragmatic, contex-
tual matter. This, I would like to suggest, is how the 
pragmatic conception of truth operates at the meta-
level. Far from encouraging us to slide down to irrespon-
sible relativism or populism, Jamesian pragmatism urges 
us to take responsibility for our practice-laden employ-
ments of the concept of truth within our everyday, sci-
entific, ethical, political, and religious lives (and any 
other sectors of human life for that matter). This pro-
foundly ethical nature of truth, integrated with truthful-
ness, is something that perhaps only a sufficiently deeply 
pragmatic account of truth can fully accommodate. 
Even so, there are further reflexive questions that 
may be posed: can we really say, for instance, that philo-
sophical theories (about truth, or about anything else), 
such as pragmatism, are themselves true or false, and in 
what sense exactly (e.g., in a pragmatist sense)?26 Is it 
sufficient for a pragmatist to maintain that pragmatism 
itself is pragmatically true? This is related to the ques-
tion how far a form of pragmatic naturalism can be 
taken in metaphilosophical reflections. According to 
philosophical naturalists, even realism may be an empiri-
cal theory about science and truth. Whatever kind of 
naturalism is available to the pragmatist, it should at 
least be self-consciously non-reductive, and thus the 
pragmatic naturalist must constantly face the challenge 
that it may be problematic to use the concept of truth in 
the same sense when applied to philosophical theories 
as it is used when applied to, say, scientific theories. I 
must leave this issue open here. 
In any event, something like critical philosophy is vi-
tally needed to stop the slide along the slippery slope 
from James via Rorty to Orwell’s O’Brien (cf. also Skow-
                                                                       
the context we operate within are constantly in flux; they 
cannot be just naively taken as self-standing fixed realities. Our 
ways of using the concept of truth themselves constantly shape 
the contexts within which we may employ different discourses 
on truth. This is a crucial element of the kind of pragmatic 
reflexivity emphasized above. On pragmatist (ontological) con-
textuality and reflexivity, see also Pihlström 2009, 2015. 
26 This, in any case, is hardly a problem just for the pragmatist. 
The correspondence-theoretician might also have to hold, 
equally reflexively, that the correspondence theory of truth cor-
responds to reality (or is made true by the objective facts about 
what truth is, or something along these lines). 
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ronski and Pihlström 2019). Critical philosophy is both 
pragmatist and Kantian in its willingness to take seriously 
the reflexive questions that haunt us whenever we use 
the notion of truth or any other concept, we are norma-
tively committed to in the very activities of using it. In 
quasi-Kantian terms, I would like to phrase my main 
result as follows: just like Kant saw empirical realism as 
possible only on the assumption of transcendental ideal-
ism, a reasonable form of realism in our contemporary 
society (and academia) not only needs to embrace a 
qualified (correspondence) account of objective truth 
but must at the meta-level be grounded in transcenden-
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